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PROPHECY, FOREKNOWLEDGE,  
AND MIDDLE KNOWLEDGE
Joseph Corabi and Rebecca Germino
Largely following on the heels of Thomas Flint’s book-length defense of  
Molinism a number of years ago, a debate has emerged about the ability  
of Molinism to explain God’s purported ability to successfully prophesy 
the occurrence of human free choices, as well as about the merits of other 
theories of divine providence and foreknowledge in this respect. After in-
troducing the relevant issues, we criticize Alexander Pruss’s recent attempt 
to show that non-Molinist views which countenance only simple foreknowl-
edge fare as well as Molinism in explaining prophecy. We locate two serious 
problems with Pruss’s proposal, and in the process clarify the theoretical 
costs and benefits of an adequate Molinist account in this sphere.
Introduction
Critiques of Molinist theories of divine providence are not by any means a 
rarity, of course. A quick survey of the literature shows that the vast major-
ity of criticisms of Molinism are external critiques: attacks on the general 
philosophical plausibility of the epistemological and (especially) metaphys-
ical tenets that form the central basis for the view. Much more unusual are 
internal critiques of Molinism: critiques that aim to show that Molinism 
fails to deliver the goods it promises, even if it is correct in its basic outlines. 
If sound, though, such criticisms could erode support for Molinism, since 
most of the reasons for preferring it to the leading alternatives boil down 
to its purportedly superior ability to accommodate a variety of tenets of 
orthodox Christianity and other theological desiderata.
Recently, Alexander Pruss has offered such an internal critique—a rea-
son to think that Thomas Flint’s paradigmatic Molinist theory fails to 
account for God’s ability to prophesy the occurrence of some free human 
actions with absolute certainty, an ability that Pruss and others (includ-
ing Flint) think God has actually exercised on a number of occasions.1 
Pruss’s critique, however, is not a mere provincial attack on Flint. (Though 
Flint is certainly no insignificant player in the debate, and so a successful 
provincial attack on him is hardly unimportant.) Pruss believes that the 
1See Alexander Pruss, “Prophecy Without Middle Knowledge,” Faith and Philosophy 24 
(2007), 433–457, responding to Thomas Flint, Divine Providence: The Molinist Account (Ithaca 
and London: Cornell University Press, 1998), especially 197–211.
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Molinist can remedy the situation, but in order to do so she must help 
herself to some crucial assumptions which are equally open to those who 
deny the existence of Middle Knowledge and believe in a God with only 
foreknowledge. Hence, according to him, Molinism enjoys no theological 
advantage over these alternative theories, at least where prophecy of free 
human actions is concerned.
Pruss is mistaken about the general prospects for Molinism and fore-
knowledge-only views where prophecy is concerned, however, and this 
paper will show why. We will begin by outlining some basic assumptions 
and summarizing Pruss’s objection to Flint’s account. (We will assume 
throughout that he has identified a problem for Flint’s own view.) Next, 
we will examine Pruss’s argument for the possibility of prophecy on 
foreknowledge-only views. We then argue that Pruss’s picture of proph-
ecy on foreknowledge-only views is probably incoherent, and even if it 
weren’t incoherent, we would be completely unjustified in accepting the 
key relevant similarity principles the view would have to employ. Fol-
lowing this, we examine the parallel amendments to Molinist views that 
are required to handle the relevant prophecy cases. We then show that 
the revised Molinism is able to give a coherent account of prophecy, and 
the prospects for justifying its parallel relevant similarity principles are 
much better (so long as the basic outlines of Molinism are correct). As 
a result, Pruss scores a shallow victory against Flint; although he may 
show that the letter of Flint’s theory is incorrect, a view in the same spirit 
can be constructed that preserves the advertised theological advantages 
of Molinism in the prophecy sphere. The upshot of this exploration is 
that we gain a better appreciation for both the theological advantages and 
theoretical costs of an adequate Molinism, vis-à-vis a theory that accepts 
only foreknowledge.
Basic Assumptions
As we alluded to above, when we speak of prophecy in this paper, we 
will be concerned exclusively with prophecies of free human actions 
qua free actions. Moreover, the paradigmatic cases of prophecy we will 
be addressing are ones where the individual whose free action is being 
prophesied is informed that the prophecy has been made prior to the 
time of the prophesied action. (Flint and Pruss focus on the famous case 
of Jesus predicting Peter’s denial of him as their main example, and we 
will follow them in this convention.2)
We also suppose that God must be 100 percent certain that the proph-
ecy will come to pass in order to issue it (or inspire someone else to issue 
it). God cannot merely have 99 percent confidence that (e.g.) Peter will 
deny Christ in order for God (in the form of Christ) to issue the prophecy, 
2Flint seems to focus primarily on the version in Luke 22, while Pruss focuses on the 
version from Matthew 26, but these differences are of no significance. In both cases similar 
prophecies of free actions are made. Incidentally, we also follow Pruss in simplifying mat-
ters by assuming that when Jesus prophesies, God prophesies.
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with the understanding that, if Peter does not freely deny Christ, God will 
simply compel him to deny Christ. For one thing, this would solve the 
problem in a way that is too simplistic to be interesting—by, in essence, 
claiming that God doesn’t actually issue pure prophecies of free actions 
qua free actions. (If this is the truth of the matter, then the literature on the 
topic is moot anyway.) And perhaps more troublesome, forcing Peter into 
denial may be contrary to God’s goodness. In addition, it could turn out 
to be impossible on its own terms, since the idea of an unfree denial may 
be an incoherent notion.3
Following Flint and Pruss, we understand Molinism to be the thesis 
that God non-trivially knows the truth values of all contingent subjunc-
tive conditionals (what we will call “F-conditionals”) of the form:
(1) x is in circumstances C → x freely chooses to do A in C
Here x is a created agent, C are circumstances which are described in 
maximal detail (with the caveat that nothing in the specification of C en-
tail either the consequent or the negation of the consequent—otherwise 
the knowledge requires only a priori inference), and A is some action.4 
We will take ‘→’ to be the symbol for subjunctive or counterfactual 
implication, and the non-triviality qualification is meant to ensure that 
cases where God knows the truth values of these conditionals only be-
cause every such conditional is false (because it is up in the air what a 
free creature would do if placed in C, as C is non-actual) do not count 
as a form of Molinism. Following standard practice, we will refer to any 
knowledge God has of the truth values of such conditionals as “Middle 
Knowledge.”5
We will also assume a standard semantics for assessing the truth val-
ues of subjunctive conditionals. While the details of the story are notori-
ously controversial, all that will matter for our purposes is the big picture, 
and opinion on that is fairly settled. Any subjunctive conditional of the 
form M → N will be true if and only if there exists a world where M and 
N are both true that is closer to the actual world (i.e., roughly speaking 
more similar to the actual world, up to the time that M occurs) than any 
world where M is true and N is false.6
Finally, we will not entertain any external critiques of Molinism—cri-
tiques designed to call into question the fundamental metaphysical or 
3For similar points, see Pruss, “Prophecy Without Middle Knowledge,” 436, and Flint, 
Divine Providence, 201. Flint makes only the point about denial being essentially free.
4For a more detailed discussion of the appropriate way to formulate these claims, see 
Dean Zimmerman, “Gale and the Free Will Defense,” Philo 6 (2003), 78–113.
5For a similar setup, see “Prophecy Without Middle Knowledge.” Incidentally, the need 
for the non-triviality qualification was first pointed out by Robert Adams, “Middle Knowl-
edge and the Problem of Evil,” American Philosophical Quarterly 14 (1977), 109–117.
6See Flint, Divine Providence, 7. Although of less central importance, we will also assume 
an analogous approach for representing the truth of F-conditionals from the perspective of 
God’s creative decision making. This will be discussed in greater detail below.
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epistemological underpinnings of the Molinist program.7 Although these 
criticisms may have considerable merit, the purpose of this paper is to as-
sess whether Molinism has a theological advantage over foreknowledge-
only alternatives where prophecy is concerned, not to assess the global 
prospects for Molinism. Consequently, we will at no point challenge 
the claim that God has Middle Knowledge or any other central tenets of 
Molinism.8
Pruss’s Argument Against Flint: A Summary
In a nutshell, Pruss’s issue with Flint’s account is that Flint fails to explain 
adequately how God could use Middle Knowledge to secure absolutely 
certain knowledge of what Peter would freely do under the relevant cir-
cumstances, of the sort required for God to issue the prophecy.
With Middle Knowledge, God could easily know the truth values of 
F-conditionals like the following, where C is a fully specified situation 
where God does not issue a prophecy about whether Peter will deny 
Christ:
(2) Peter is in C → Peter denies Christ
God can even unproblematically know the truth values of such F-
conditionals when C involves Peter’s belief that God has prophesied his 
denial, so long as the belief is not actually true. But of course what God 
really needs is substantive knowledge about how Peter would act if he 
believed truly that God had issued a prophecy. Why do things become 
problematic if God has in fact issued the prophecy? Because then a coun-
terfactual of (2)’s form is true only because:
(3) Peter is in C ⇒ Peter denies Christ9
(3) holds because C includes God’s prophecy that Peter will deny 
Christ, it is part of the concept of God that he is essentially omniscient and 
truthful, and so it is a conceptual truth that if God prophesies something, 
it will come to pass. But why, we might wonder, is this such a problem? 
Why can’t God just use his knowledge of this conceptual truth in order to 
issue the prophecy in question? Certainly, this knowledge is not Middle 
Knowledge, but it is knowledge that everyone agrees God would have.
The trouble is that (3) is tautologous, and therefore provides no infor-
mation that is useful to God in deciding whether to issue a prophecy. 
After all, God also knows:
7Prominent examples of such critiques include a number of arguments in William 
Hasker, God, Time, and Knowledge (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), and the central 
attack in Robert M. Adams’s “An Anti-Molinist Argument,” in Philosophical Perspectives 5 
(1991), 343–353.
8As Flint points out (Divine Providence, 42–43), Middle Knowledge is more inclusive than 
just knowledge of F-conditionals. Nothing we say here should be taken to imply otherwise; 
in any case, none of these issues should have any bearing in this context.
9The ‘⇒’ here is the symbol for entailment.
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(4) Peter is in C* (where C* involves God prophesying that Peter will 
not deny Christ) ⇒ Peter does not deny Christ.
(3) and (4) together make it clear that God needs to know something 
more substantive in order to responsibly decide whether to prophesy 
Peter’s denial. So far, so good—Flint himself is aware of this problem.10 
The trouble, as Pruss sees it, is in how Flint attempts to deal with the issue.
Flint proposes a solution.11 In essence, he wants us to consider all F-
conditionals of the form:
(5) Peter is in C** and Peter believes at t that God prophesies that Peter 
will deny Christ because of reason R → Peter denies Christ.
Here C** are general background conditions that describe the circum-
stances of Peter’s decision to deny Christ in fully determinate detail, minus 
a specification of whether Peter believes at t (the time of the Last Supper, 
several hours before the denial decisions) that God has prophesied his 
denial and minus anything that would entail such a specification.12 R is 
some reason (aside from God’s actually prophesying the denial) why Peter 
believes God has so prophesied; it could be a complicated hallucination, 
Peter mishearing Jesus, etc.
If all such F-conditionals have the same truth value, Flint refers to them 
as “harmonious.” If they are harmonious because they are all true, then 
Flint claims that God can conjoin them with:
(6) Peter is in C** and Peter believes at t that God prophesies that Peter 
will deny Christ because God really does prophesy that Peter will 
deny Christ ⇒ Peter denies Christ.
Then, by what Flint takes to be a plausible principle of counterfactual 
inference, God can conclude that no matter how Peter comes to believe 
that God prophesies his denial, Peter will deny Christ.13 So, God can go 
ahead and issue the prophecy whenever he is lucky enough that the F-
conditionals are harmonious in this way. (Flint thinks this sort of har-
mony would always be a contingent matter.)14
10See Flint, Divine Providence, 200.
11We follow Pruss in ignoring what Flint calls his “First Solution” (which is just that the 
prophecy is not a prophecy of a free action qua free). Pruss splits Flint’s “Second Solution” 
into two parts, but the first part leads directly into the second, which ultimately captures 
the view Flint endorses.
12In both the Matthew and Luke accounts (as well as the account in Mark 14), Peter is 
represented as having forgotten the prediction at the time of the denial decisions, remem-
bering it only after the crowing of the rooster has concluded. This is potentially significant, 
since it suggests that Jesus’s prediction was not within Peter’s awareness at the time of his 
decisions.
13The basic principle is that, for any true counterfactuals of the form G → I and H → I  ,  
(G v H) → I will also be true. This can be iterated as many times as needed to accommo-
date all the possible antecedents, recalling that when an antecedent entails a consequent, it 
also counterfactually implies that consequent.
14Flint, Divine Providence, 207–208.
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Pruss counters by contending that the bells and whistles provided by 
this account do nothing but obscure the force of the original problem; 
they do nothing to solve it. The original difficulty, of course, was that God 
lacked the substantive grounds needed to issue the prophecy with 100 
percent certainty. Although knowing that in a wide array of other circum-
stances Peter denies Christ (many of them qualitatively indistinguishable 
from a scenario where God really does prophesy) may give God consider-
able evidence that Peter would deny Christ if a genuine prophecy is made, 
it does not give God absolute certainty that issuing a genuine prophecy 
will not somehow alter Peter’s free decision from what it would be in one 
of the non-genuine cases. Hence, God still lacks the substantive informa-
tion he needs, and this hole cannot be filled by using the tautologous (and 
hence insubstantial) (6).15
Pruss’s Solution, and How It Applies to  
Foreknowledge-Only Accounts: A Summary
Now that we have seen the basic issue for Flint, we are in a position to 
examine Pruss’s solution, and how Pruss applies it to foreknowledge-only 
accounts. Pruss proposes that a relevant similarity principle may hold, of 
the following form:
(SP) If C R C1 and if x does A in C, then x would have still done A in C1
SP here is but a schema. To be made into a full-fledged principle, the 
R relation must be specified. Beyond claiming that it would need to be 
an equivalence relation, though, Pruss takes no specific stand on what 
R could be. Instead, he considers a range of possibilities—everything be-
tween complete subjective indistinguishability (across times) for the agent 
x on one extreme to rough sameness of available reasons for action (at the 
time of the decision) on the other extreme.16 But as long as some R relation 
makes the principle true, this might be enough for a God with Middle 
Knowledge to identify situations where He could safely issue prophecies. 
15It is important to Pruss’s case that Flint be interpreted as claiming that the F-condi-
tionals for all the instances where Peter believes that God has prophesied his denial (but 
where God has not in fact so prophesied) are harmonious simply by accident, as a mere 
coincidence. This is what motivates Pruss’s upcoming solution involving a relevant similar-
ity principle; it is intended to provide grounds for extending (with certainty) the lessons 
from the non-prophecy F-conditionals to the genuine prophecy ones. If this is an incorrect 
reading of Flint, then Flint can simply fall back on such a principle to rescue his view. For-
tunately, the interest of neither Pruss’s own discussion nor our argument hinges on this 
interpretive issue, because the central matter is not the success of Flint’s specific account 
(which everyone seems to agree can be tidied up if necessary), but rather the adequacy of 
Pruss’s non-Molinist view. Our claim is that there is good reason to suppose that this view 
is incoherent, and even if it isn’t, it provides no theoretical advantages over Molinism in 
explaining prophecy; in fact, it actually suffers from serious drawbacks. (We are grateful to 
Flint for pointing out to us in correspondence the potential issues with Pruss’s interpreta-
tion here.)
16“Prophecy Without Middle Knowledge,” 450–452. Here “subjective indistinguishabil-
ity” should also be understood to involve sameness of underlying character as well.
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The Molinist could then plausibly conjecture that the Peter prophecy is 
such a scenario.
To be helpful to the Molinist, Pruss also thinks that any such prin-
ciple would have to be a necessary truth (or at least more than a mere 
coincidence, as Flint seems to suggest F-conditional harmony would be), 
because it would need to be in virtue of some general feature of the cir-
cumstances that the principle held. (Pruss acknowledges that putting 
one’s finger on the general feature is difficult since we are dealing with 
circumstances involving libertarian free will—rather than conceptual or 
nomic necessitation—but he doesn’t find the idea that there could be such 
general features incoherent.) In a situation where God was contemplating 
prophesying that x would do A, he could only make use of this principle 
(to justify his belief that prophesying would not alter x’s doing A) if it 
were true in virtue of some general feature of circumstances R-related 
to C, along with his recognition that the circumstances associated with 
a genuine prophecy would be R-related to C. Otherwise—if the principle 
were merely accidentally true for C and the Cn not involving a real proph-
ecy—there would be no guarantee that just because it held in a variety 
of other circumstances, it would continue to hold in the crucial case of 
genuine prophecy.
Pruss thinks that as long as the Molinist is willing to live with this 
baggage, then she can hold that God is able to use his Middle Knowl-
edge to issue at least some prophecies of free actions. However, Pruss also 
thinks that those who reject Molinism and accept only foreknowledge can 
then enjoy basically the same benefits. If the foreknowledge-only propo-
nent accepts such a relevant similarity principle, he too can make sense 
of prophecy, thus vitiating a theological advantage of belief in Middle 
Knowledge. According to Pruss, the explanatory account for the Petrine 
prophecy using only foreknowledge would go as follows (in explanatory 
order from first to last):
(i) God decides that at t1 Peter will be in C+ either due to a hallucinatory 
or real prophecy about denying Christ. (Here C+ are the circum-
stances Peter finds himself in at the Last Supper as represented in 
the relevant scriptural account, minus a specification of why Peter 
believes God has prophesied his denial.)
(ii)  Peter at t1 is in C+ due to receiving a hallucinatory or real prophecy 
about denying Christ.
(iii) Peter denies Christ at t1.
(iv) God knows (ii), (iii), and some relevant similarity principle where 
the circumstances of Peter believing God has prophesied his denial 
because of a hallucination are R-related to the circumstances of Pe-
ter believing this because of a genuine prophecy.
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(v)  God brings it about that at t0 (the time of the exchange at the Last 
Supper) Peter receives a real prophecy about denying Christ.17
Why Pruss’s Account of Prophecy on  
Foreknowledge-Only Views Is Problematic
If plausible, Pruss’s account of prophecy on foreknowledge-only views 
would be a blow to the Molinist case, since as we alluded to earlier a major 
motivation for accepting Molinism is its alleged ability to give a theoretical 
underpinning to what many take to be central claims of Christianity 
(such as that God can issue prophecies about free actions) where other 
views fail to provide that underpinning. Alas, the account suffers from 
serious problems. At least as it is articulated here, Pruss’s foreknowledge-
only theory of prophecy requires God to bracket that foreknowledge in a 
way that would be impossible for an omniscient being (or worse, posits 
that God remains wholly ignorant of some facts).
The crucial assumption we must make to appreciate this difficulty—
an eminently plausible one—is that, necessarily, disjunctions (if true) are 
always true because one of their disjuncts is true (or both). This claim is 
entailed by the common-sense view of disjunction, as well as by every 
semantic theory we are aware of. Hence, whenever God knows that a dis-
junction is true (like the disjunction in (ii) above), God in addition knows 
which disjunct makes it true.18 But now we can give the following argu-
ment:
(A) Either God knows that (ψ) “Peter is in C+ because he has a received a 
hallucinatory or real prophecy” because God knows that (θ)“Peter 
is in C+ because he has received a hallucinatory prophecy” or be-
cause God knows that (ϕ) “Peter is in C+ because he has received a 
real prophecy.”19
(B) If God knows (ψ) because God knows (ϕ), then God has made a 
prophecy at some point previously in the explanatory sequence 
that Peter will deny Christ. (God’s knowledge that a certain state of 
affairs holds—where that state of affairs involves God’s action—is 
posterior in the order of explanation to God’s action.)
(C) If God has made a prophecy at some point previously in the ex-
planatory sequence that Peter will deny Christ, then it is NOT the 
17“Prophecy Without Middle Knowledge,” 448.
18Ordinary persons can know disjunctions without knowing which disjunct makes 
them true, but the same does not hold for God. Bill, for instance, could know that $100 has 
been stolen from his office, and he could know that only Bob and Mike had access to the of-
fice. Hence, he could know that either Bob stole the money or Mike stole the money, without 
knowing which. But plainly the same doesn’t go for God.
19We can suppose that God knows the relevant propositions either timelessly or from 
the earliest instant of time, in keeping with a picture where it is assumed that God has 
foreknowledge.
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case that part of God’s justification for His decision to prophesy 
that Peter will deny Christ is that God knows (ψ). (This would vio-
late prohibitions on the circularity of explanation; it can’t be in this 
context both that God’s prophecy explains his knowledge of a claim 
that justifies his prophesying and also that his knowledge of the 
claim that justifies his prophesying explains his prophesying.)
(D) If God knows (ψ) because God knows (θ), then God does not proph-
esy that Peter will deny Christ. ((θ) involves no prophecy taking 
place.)
(E)  If God does not prophesy that Peter will deny Christ, then it is NOT 
the case that part of God’s justification for His decision to prophesy 
that Peter will deny Christ is that God knows (ψ). (This is obvious, 
since there is no decision to prophesy in this case, and hence no 
justification for any decision to prophesy.)
But then on either horn of the dilemma, we get:
(F)  It is NOT the case that part of God’s justification for His decision to 
prophesy that Peter will deny Christ is that God knows (ψ).
Where does this leave us? It makes it clear that the explanatory sequence 
of Pruss’s foreknowledge-only account of prophecy (as stated) can’t be cor-
rect, since (ψ) is equivalent to (ii) in that sequence, and God’s knowledge 
of (ii) played an explanatory role (by justifying his decision to prophesy), 
contrary to the conclusion of the argument we have just seen. But without 
this explanatory sequence, the account falls apart. If, on the one hand, God 
simply foreknows a scenario where there is no prophecy, then obviously 
God can’t use this information to issue a prophecy! (Even God can’t erase 
reality, whatever exactly that would mean.)20 If, on the other, God simply 
foreknows a prophecy, then we are back where we started—wondering 
what justified God in issuing a prophecy in the first place.
It might be objected that our argument has misrepresented the situa-
tion in which God finds himself. Basically, we have assumed that the only 
way God could have knowledge of (ψ) is either for God to have knowledge 
of (θ) or for God to have knowledge of (ϕ). But there is another way for 
20As Pruss himself admits, in a different context: “It is incoherent to suppose that time is 
rolled back and something else happens.” (“Prophecy Without Middle Knowledge,” 455, empha-
sis in original). Pruss presumably has the idea that God can leave the temporally earlier parts 
of the causal story that results in Peter being in C+ open, then somehow fill them in at a later 
logical moment. But if He foreknows that Peter is in C+, this implies that the causal story of 
Peter’s being in C+ is already complete. Otherwise, there would be no state of Peter being in 
C+ to foresee, since the pieces would not be in place to have brought about Peter’s being in C+. 
(There can’t be an event that plays a role in the causal story of Peter’s being in C+ which has 
no specific cause at an initial logical moment, and which God then returns to at a later logical 
moment and decides will go from having no specific cause to having a specific cause—e.g., 
Peter’s experience of seeming to hear Jesus predict his denial cannot have no specific cause 
at an initial logical moment and then come to be caused by Jesus genuinely predicting his 
denial at a later logical moment. This amounts to just the kind of rewriting of history that is 
unacceptable, and which Pruss himself rejects.)
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God to know (ψ) according to this objection: God can simply decide that 
it will be true, as (i) states, without deciding initially which disjunct will 
make it true.21
While potentially seductive, this objection fails. Recall that Pruss is 
not proposing a Molinist story, where God has the benefit of knowing 
various F-conditionals in a moment explanatorily prior to his creation 
of Peter. Pruss’s non-Molinist God can know that Peter will deny God 
in C+ (or in other relevantly similar circumstances) only once Peter has 
actually denied God in C+.22 (To reject this would be to give God Middle 
Knowledge.) But, if Peter actually denies God in C+, then Peter’s being in 
C+ itself already needs to have an explanation (i.e., its explanation must 
have come in explanatory moments prior to Peter’s being in C+). But then 
we are faced with the same sort of dilemma: either Peter is in C+ because 
God prophesied his denial or not. (If not, then presumably Peter is in 
C+ because he misheard or hallucinated something.) If Peter is in those 
circumstances because God prophesied his denial, then God prophesied 
without knowing what Peter would do. If Peter is in the circumstances for 
some other reason, then God did not prophesy Peter’s denial (or at least 
God’s prophecy has nothing to do with Peter’s belief that God so proph-
esied). Neither option is palatable, since the scenario calls both for God 
to prophesy with certainty that Peter would deny Jesus and for God’s 
prophecy to be part of the explanation of Peter’s being in the circum-
stances he is in.
We resist claiming that Pruss’s account is incoherent because Pruss of-
fers the disjunctive approach above only as an example of how prophecy 
of free actions might be possible given only foreknowledge.23 However, 
aside from some sketchy suggestions at the end of his paper, he offers us 
no other examples or accounts that help us to understand how what he is 
proposing might be coherent after all. We rest content at having shifted 
the burden of proof strongly back onto his side and conclude that his view 
as presently defended is inadequate.
A Further Problem For Pruss’s Account
There is a further problem for Pruss’s foreknowledge-only account. In 
fact, it is in some ways a deeper problem, because it prompts us to appreci-
ate not just the inadequacy of a foreknowledge-only account of prophecy 
(which has already been established), but also the theoretical costs of an 
adequate and potentially plausible Molinist view.
This additional problem surrounds the justification for supposing 
that a relevant similarity principle of the form (SP) above is correct if a 
21We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer from this journal for pressing us to clarify 
our argument by answering this objection.
22“Once” here is used in an explanatory sense, not a temporal one. To take the temporal 
implications too seriously here would be to threaten God’s foreknowledge.
23We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out the need for this clarification.
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foreknowledge-only account is true. We will argue that such a principle 
is much easier to justify if Molinism is true than if a foreknowledge-only 
account is true. Before starting out, though, it will be important to provide 
a bit of background that will allow us to think more precisely about the 
relevant issues.
The most important background items to introduce are the related con-
cepts of a “creaturely world-type” and a “galaxy” (of possible worlds).24 
Intuitively, a creaturely world-type is a maximal set of F-conditionals. 
While the exact formal specification of the notion remains somewhat con-
troversial, Flint suggests the following characterization, which is satisfac-
tory for our purposes:
(WT) T is a creaturely world-type if and only if for any F-conditional (C 
→ A), either (C → A) is a member of T or there exists a proposi-
tion A* such that (C → A*) is an F-conditional and (C → A*) is a 
member of T.25
A galaxy is a set of possible worlds where the same creaturely world-
type is true in each world. (In other words, the same set of F-conditionals 
is true at each of the worlds. So, e.g., all the worlds in a particular gal-
axy will agree with one another about what Curley would freely do if he 
were offered a $5,000 bribe in circumstances C.) But, assuming there are 
non-trivially true F-conditionals, the true creaturely world-type is only 
contingently true, since what makes a particular F-conditional true is the 
libertarian free choice of a (possible or actual) being. Clearly that choice 
could have been different and, had it been, it would have changed which 
creaturely world-type was true. But nevertheless, the only feasible worlds 
for God to create will be worlds within the galaxy whose creaturely world-
type corresponds to the creaturely world-type which is in fact true.26
At this point, it will be helpful to develop a heuristic for thinking about 
God’s creative decisions according to Molinism and foreknowledge-only 
views respectively. This will set the stage for us to lay bare the difficul-
ties for foreknowledge-only views and show the costs of an adequate 
Molinism.
24These notions will be familiar to some from the literature, and from Flint, Divine Provi-
dence, 47–54.
25Flint, Divine Providence, 50. Previously we introduced the consequents of conditionals 
of this form as actions, and here they are being treated as propositions (albeit propositions 
that describe actions). We will not be overly fussy about these formulations, as no issues of 
substance hang on them for our purposes.
26We use the term “feasible” here in the way that Flint uses it in Divine Providence. A 
world is feasible for God to create iff God is able to actualize it. One might object: can’t God 
actualize any possible world? Isn’t that basically what it means for a world to be (metaphys-
ically) possible? The reply, of course, is that some worlds involve creatures freely performing 
particular actions, and there is no way for God to compel creatures to perform these ac-
tions. E.g., there is a possible world where Curley freely accepts a $5,000 bribe when placed 
in circumstances C. But if the true creaturely world-type states that Curley would not in fact 
freely accept such a bribe if placed in C, God will be powerless to actualize the world in 
question where Curley freely accepts the bribe. 
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We begin by looking at Molinism.27 An important aspect of F-condi-
tionals to appreciate is that, in the explanatory moments when God is con-
templating what world to actualize, there is (ex hypothesi) no actual world 
yet. Hence, we cannot represent the truth of an F-conditional like (C → 
A) at this stage by claiming that the closest C world (to the actual world) is 
an A world rather than a ~A world. Rather, what we need is what we will 
refer to as a “complete world diagram” (CWD). A CWD is a set with two 
layers of structure (with other special features); in other words, it is a set 
of sets. Each CWD is designed to represent all of the modal information 
encapsulated in any possible creative choice God could make. It is analo-
gous to a possible world, but represents possible scenarios faced by God 
in making creative choices.
We construct any given CWD by first taking sets of all the possible 
worlds grouped into galaxies. (So far, all the sets will appear identical, 
since the worlds and the galaxy each world belongs to is constant.) At 
this point, we have a representation of all the possible worlds and their 
closeness relations, as captured by the galactic relationships.28 Next, we 
take one of these sets and mark one galaxy as having the true creaturely 
world-type, and hence as containing the only feasible worlds for God to 
actualize; one can think of this galaxy as “glowing” if one likes. Then, 
one takes all the sets like this (each with a different galaxy glowing) and 
forms a second-order set composed of them. Now, we have a representa-
tion not just of the possible worlds and their closeness relations, but also 
a representation of what possible creaturely world-types could be true. 
(The contingency of creaturely world-types is captured at this second 
level, where each set represents a different creaturely world-type as being 
true—a different galaxy glowing.) Next, we take each first-order set and 
mark one of the worlds in its glowing galaxy (as well as a single world 
in each of the non-glowing galaxies). The world we mark in the glowing 
galaxy represents the world God would actualize if that particular first-
order set represented the creative situation that faces God (i.e., accurately 
represents what creaturely world-type is feasible for God—what galaxy 
is glowing). The world in each non-glowing galaxy represents what God 
27Because of spatial constraints, we will not attempt to discuss God’s creative choices 
in detail, and how these choices would be explanatorily structured if Molinism were true. 
This is a well-studied phenomenon in the literature, and the details are not important for 
our purposes.
28Throughout, we will be assuming that within any given galaxy G, each member of G 
is closer to every other member of G than it is to any world outside G. In fact, we will go 
slightly further than this, assuming that for every world w in G and every initial segment 
in w, up through the end of that initial segment w is closer to every other world in G (up 
through its parallel initial segment) than it is to any world (up through its parallel initial 
segment) outside G. Both the principles are plausible, and in fact Flint conjectures that the 
principle for entire worlds is true (Divine Providence, 52–53). These assumptions may be 
dispensable, but it would make the subsequent arguments considerably more complicated. 
Henceforth, when we speak of the closeness of worlds, we will be supposing that it is the 
closeness of their initial segments up through the relevant time that is at issue. (Sometimes 
we will continue to emphasize this if there is the potential for confusion.)
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would have actualized in that creative choice scenario had that particular 
galaxy been glowing instead.29 Finally, to complete our CWD, we mark 
one of the first-order sets as accurately representing which galaxy is glow-
ing—which creaturely world-type is in fact true. This gives us a repre-
sentation of God’s specific creative choice, along with a representation of 
the possible worlds, their closeness relations, and what creaturely world-
types could have been true (as well as which one in fact is).30
To sum up briefly, a construction of a single CWD occurs in several 
stages:31
(1)  Form a structured set of all the PWs grouped into galaxies g1 … gm.
(2)  Mark one of the galaxies as glowing and call the resulting set “s1”.
(3) Repeat steps (1) and (2) indefinitely, creating new sets s2 … sn until 
each galaxy has been marked as glowing in one of the sets.
(4)  Form a set S of the sets s1 … sn.
(5)  In each of the s1 … sn, mark one of the worlds in each g1 … gm as the 
world God would actualize in that gx if that gx captured the true 
creaturely world-type.
(6)  Mark one of the s1 … sn as correctly representing the true creaturely 
world-type.
We can now picture God’s creative decision according to Molinism as 
follows: imagine each CWD as a point in a space, similar to a possible 
world in the space of possible worlds. At the center of this space is God, 
at the explanatory moment where he is deciding what world to actualize. 
If Molinism is true, then God has Middle Knowledge, and hence knows 
which creaturely world-type is true. Thus, we can envision CWDs that 
represent this world-type being true occupying a nebulous orbit imme-
diately surrounding God, with CWDs that represent other world-types 
being true occupying orbits substantially further away from God.32 When 
29Flint claims that any creative act by God resulting in the actualization of one of the fea-
sible worlds would also include a conditional decision by God about what worlds he would 
have actualized had other galaxies had the true creaturely world-type instead (Divine 
Providence, 60). This seems right, but the issues raised won’t be relevant for our purposes. 
30One might wonder how CWDs represent an improvement over the apparatus intro-
duced by Flint (Divine Providence, 51–59). Although Flint’s apparatus is adequate to his task, 
it is important for our purposes (as will become clear shortly) that we be able to represent 
God’s relationship to his creative choice possibilities analogously to the way that we repre-
sent the closeness of possible worlds to one another. CWDs allow us to do this in a way that 
Flint’s original machinery does not.
31The following summary assumes there are denumerably many galaxies and worlds, 
but this simplification could be dispensed with if need be.
32According to most forms of Molinism, God has no power over which creaturely world-
type is true. There are variant forms of Molinism that claim otherwise—most notably so-
called “Maverick Molinism”—but these views suffer from serious problems. Consequently, 
we will ignore them.
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God makes his creative choice, we can think of him as selecting one of the 
CWDs from this inner orbit and placing it “right on top of him,” as it were, 
with full awareness of what is going to result. It is at this explanatory mo-
ment that he strongly actualizes states of affairs which, together with free 
creaturely choices (known by God via Middle Knowledge), result in the 
weak actualization of an entire world.33 Put all of that together and one 
CWD becomes completely correct. At this point, all the other CWDs (both 
in the inner orbit of feasibility and the outer orbits) arrange themselves 
into fixed positions within their orbital region, based on their closeness to 
the CWD which has become fully correct. (In this arrangement process, 
CWDs always remain in the orbital vicinity of the other CWDs that repre-
sent the same creaturely world-type being true that they do.)
Things are basically the same for a foreknowledge-only view, with one 
crucial difference. God does not have Middle Knowledge, and so doesn’t 
know which creaturely world-type is true prior to making his creative 
decision.34 Consequently, on this approach, when God goes to create, he 
is blind to which group of CWDs occupies the inner orbit. He is cut-off 
from this sort of awareness, forced to rest content only in knowing which 
CWD will wind up correct if any particular creaturely world-type is true 
(given the states of affairs he plans to strongly actualize). It is only after he 
strongly actualizes the various strongly actualizable states of affairs that 
he learns the orbital arrangements of the various CWDs, including which 
one wound up being correct (and thus which world wound up weakly 
actualized).
Now, we are in position to fully appreciate the problem for the propo-
nent of a foreknowledge-only view. Recall our relevant similarity prin-
ciple schema above:
(SP) If C R C1 and if x does A in C, then x would have still done A in C1
Recall that the foreknowledge-only proponent hopes that such a prin-
ciple will justify God in issuing a prophecy (like the prophecy of Peter’s 
denial) by allowing God to extrapolate (with certainty) from a person’s 
33Here we ignore issues about the analogues of F-conditionals for indeterministic but 
unfree events. Incidentally, the terminology of “strong actualization” and “weak actualiza-
tion” first appeared in the now famous reintroduction of Molinism in Alvin Plantinga, The 
Nature of Necessity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974). 
34We assume that even if a foreknowledge-only view is true, there are still non-triv-
ially true F-conditionals of the sort the Molinist believes in. (The central difference in 
the non-Molinist case, though, is that God lacks (at least) pre-volitional knowledge of 
these F-conditionals.) While this may be a controversial assumption, Flint points out 
(Divine Providence, 40) that Molina himself basically took for granted that his libertarian 
opponents accepted it. Moreover (and perhaps more to the point), in order for Pruss’s 
foreknowledge-only view to have any semblance of plausibility, he must assume that 
there are at least some such F-conditionals, and he openly acknowledges that he is com-
mitted to there being some (“Prophecy Without Middle Knowledge,” 449). This is really 
all that is required for our arguments to work, but giving a formulation that takes full 
account of the technical variations that could arise would make the presentation pro-
hibitively long. 
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pattern of free behavior in cases where there is not a divine prophecy to 
a conclusion about how the person would freely behave if there were a 
divine prophecy.
The scope and nature of the R relation will not matter for our pur-
poses (at least at the moment), so we can simply assume R amounts to 
whatever the foreknowledge-only proponent thinks is required to make 
sense of all the important prophecy cases. One thing that does matter 
for our purposes, though, is whether this principle is supposed to hold 
purely by accident (i.e., by coincidence), necessarily, or as a result of some 
general feature of x (which preserves the certainty of x freely doing A in 
circumstances R-related to C in the actual world’s galaxy, but not in all 
other galaxies). (Pruss, at least, favors the second option, but he is willing 
to take the third seriously as well.)35 Unfortunately, there are very serious 
problems for each of these approaches.
The issues are easiest to see for the “by accident” fork. As Pruss himself 
notes, this answer won’t help.36 The trouble is that, if the principle holds 
by accident for C and C1–Cn where there is no genuine prophecy, how is 
God going to use this result to gain confidence (let alone certainty) that, 
when he genuinely prophesies that Peter will deny Christ, Peter will in 
fact deny Christ? There is no way it can help him in that case, because 
there is no guarantee (indeed, no reason to suppose) that the fortuitous 
coincidence will continue in the event of a real prophecy. So plainly the 
foreknowledge-only proponent will want to look for other options.37
What about if the principle is true necessarily? This looks quite a bit 
more promising, at least initially. If it is true necessarily, then presumably 
God will grasp its necessity and see that he can project its results onto the 
situation of genuine prophecy. (In fact, he will need to grasp its necessity, 
because he will need to know that it is true to prophesy with the requisite 
certainty, and grasping its necessity is presumably the only way some-
one like God could know a necessary truth of this sort.) But even if we 
set aside the pesky issue of genuine prophecies, there’s trouble brewing 
here. If such a principle is true necessarily, then let us return to our earlier 
heuristic to understand better what the situation will look like, focusing 
on our Petrine paradigm.
In this case, from the perspective of any world where Peter denies 
Christ in C, it will follow according to the principle that at that world it is 
35“Prophecy Without Middle Knowledge,” 446–447.
36Ibid., 446.
37It might be tempting to think that God can simply know that circumstances of genu-
ine prophecy would be R-related to C, and hence be covered by the principle. But how 
could this be so if the principle is true by accident? The suggestion here fails to account 
for the lessons that came out of contemplating the original problem. God needs to have a 
special justification for thinking that he can issue the prophecy in the first place, because 
genuine prophecy is a special kind of case. Lessons about it cannot be easily inferred from 
non-prophecy situations, and simple ad hoc declarations that it is possible are bound to be 
unsatisfying. 
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also true that “Peter is in C1 → Peter denies Christ.”38 Using our preferred 
semantics for counterfactuals, then, this will imply that the nearest world 
(to any Peter in C world) where Peter is in C1 is always a world where Peter 
denies Christ.39 Similarly (since ‘A’ is just a variable in the (SP), to be filled 
in by any action), from the perspective of any world where Peter doesn’t 
deny Christ in C, it will be true that “Peter is in C1 → Peter doesn’t deny 
Christ,” implying that the nearest world where Peter is in C1 will be a 
world where he doesn’t deny Jesus. The result will be a partitioning of all 
the galaxies into two classes—one a class of galaxies whose characteristic 
world-type claims that if Peter were in C or any of C1–Cn, he would deny 
Christ, and the other a class where the characteristic world-type claims 
that in any of these circumstances Peter would not deny Christ.
Now we reach a crucial juncture. It is important to recognize that the 
differences in closeness between worlds here are what we might call 
“primitive” differences in closeness; in other words, they do not super-
vene on qualitative similarity or similarity of laws in the way that is fa-
miliar from the evaluation of standard nomic counterfactuals like “If the 
crystal vase had been dropped from the top of the Eiffel Tower, then it 
would have shattered.” To see why, consider a world (w) where Peter is in 
C and does deny Christ. Now, consider two worlds where Peter is in C1; 
in one of these worlds, Peter denies Christ (w1) and, in the other (w2), he 
doesn’t. (We know that both worlds exist because Peter’s decision is free, 
and so it is possible for him to choose either option.) Ex hypothesi, because 
Peter’s decision is free, we can choose these two worlds so that their ini-
tial segments (up through the time of C1) are qualitatively identical to one 
another; the same qualitative circumstances hold in each, the same laws 
of nature, etc. And moreover, we can choose them so that they represent 
the closest C1 worlds where Peter denies Christ, on the one hand, and 
doesn’t deny him, on the other. If the relevant similarity principle holds, 
then w will be closer to w1  than to w2, but plainly, since the relevant initial 
segments of w1 and w2 are qualitatively identical to one another, whatever 
is responsible for the closeness difference between each of them and w 
could not be a matter of qualitative similarity. And since there is really 
no other candidate to serve as a basis for the closeness relation, the differ-
ences have to be sui generis.40
38There is another way to interpret the claim that the principle is necessary. If one reads 
“x does A in C” as “x actually does A in C,” and one interprets the term “actual” to rigidly 
designate a particular world, then the principle will be trivially necessary if true at all, 
since (on plausible assumptions about modal logic) the principle will be necessarily actu-
ally true if it is actually true simpliciter. In this case, the necessity option will simply col-
lapse back into one of the contingent options for all intents and purposes. Consequently, 
we ignore it.
39Note that the sort of F-conditional we have here is a regular counterfactual that can be 
evaluated using a regular semantics in terms of closeness of worlds. This stands in contrast 
to the F-conditionals that apply when God is preparing to make his initial creative decision.
40Strictly speaking, of course, there is another candidate; we could treat F-conditionals 
at worlds as having primitive truth values, and then count similarity of counterfactuals in 
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Thus, on this foreknowledge-only picture, after God engages in his 
creative decision and strongly actualizes some states of affairs (resulting 
in the weak actualization of a world), he will be in a position to know 
primitive closeness relations between worlds, and hence to know the non-
trivial truth values of F-conditionals at this world. But if God is able to 
know these primitive closeness relationships, why deny God knowledge 
of primitive closeness relationships between his initial starting point and 
the various orbits of CWDs—in particular, the knowledge of which set of 
CWDs represent the true creaturely world-type (i.e., the set of CWDs that 
represent the correct galaxy as glowing)? To do so is totally unprincipled. 
The main reason to deny this sort of knowledge to God in his initial state 
of creative deliberation is suspicion about God’s ability to know primi-
tive closeness relations (or their very existence)—suspicion about whether 
it makes sense to speak of God knowing which F-conditionals are true, 
and hence God being aware of primitive closeness relations of one sort or 
another. But once we have set aside our objection to primitive closeness 
(and indeed, to God’s knowledge of primitive closeness relationships), the 
bulwark against full-on Molinism seems to have been removed. For there 
appears to be no principled reason in that case to maintain that God can 
know primitive closeness relationships between worlds, but can’t know 
primitive closeness relationships between CWDs and his creative start-
ing point.
A possible objection here—suggested by some of Pruss’s remarks—is 
that Molinism requires God to know F-conditionals that have no actual 
truth-makers, while the F-conditionals Pruss thinks God would know do 
have an actual truth-maker (Peter’s actual decision about whether to deny 
Christ).41 According to this line of thinking, it is only knowledge of un-
grounded F-conditionals that is problematic.
Although initially plausible perhaps, the objection fails. While it is se-
ductive to think of Peter’s denial in the actual world as somehow relevant 
to the truth of an F-conditional about what he would have done in different 
circumstances, no proposed semantics for any sort of subjunctive condi-
tional allows for this. It is crucial to keep in mind that only similarity up 
through the end of the initial segment is relevant, and the decision comes 
after the initial segment. (The antecedent of an F-conditional is defined so 
that it does not entail the consequent or its negation, or otherwise lay bare 
on conceptual or nomic grounds whether the consequent holds.)
different worlds as important factors in fixing their closeness to one another. (This appears 
to be Plantinga’s view in The Nature of Necessity, 178 and also in other writings.) For our 
purposes, though, going this route winds up being equivalent to the primitive closeness 
picture; the only difference between the approaches is where we choose to locate our fun-
damental primitiveness. The same points will apply to this primitive truth value picture 
mutatis mutandis.
41See “Prophecy Without Middle Knowledge,” 449. Incidentally, the famous anti- 
Molinist Robert Adams also seems to endorse the truth of these sorts of F-conditionals 
(and God’s knowledge of them). See his “Middle Knowledge and the Problem of Evil,” 
American Philosophical Quarterly 14 (1977), 109–117. 
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The seductiveness here is probably due to our tendency to smuggle as-
sumptions that are appropriate for ordinary nomic counterfactuals into a 
context where they don’t belong. If an unknown object is actually dropped 
from a height of five feet onto a marble floor and shatters, it is probably 
safe to assume that if it had been dropped from a height of ten feet onto 
that floor (or from a height of five feet onto a concrete floor), it still would 
have shattered. But there is no mystery in this—no primitive closeness 
relations between worlds. The bottom line is that the initial segment of 
the nearest 10-foot drop world where the object shatters is going to be 
closer to the actual world than the initial segment of the nearest 10-foot 
drop world where it doesn’t shatter because the segment in the shattering 
world is more qualitatively similar to that of the actual world. (The laws in 
the non-shattering world are likely to be quite a bit different from those of 
the actual world, for instance, or else the floor is likely to be qualitatively 
different—padded perhaps.) This fact has nothing whatsoever to do with 
the outcome—the shattering—in the actual world, except insofar as the 
outcome in the actual world gives us a clue as to the similarity between 
nomic processes there and in the other world.
Things are completely disanalogous with F-conditionals, of course, 
because nomic processes are not going to drive the transition from ante-
cedent to consequent. Any C1 world where Peter denies Jesus is going to 
have a parallel C1 world where Peter doesn’t deny Jesus that is perfectly 
qualitatively identical to it (and identical in its laws) until the moment the 
decision is made.
So much, then, for believing that the relevant similarity principle holds 
necessarily (in the context of a foreknowledge-only view). This position 
tries to find a middle ground between denying that God has knowledge 
of any primitive closeness relations and believing that God has expan-
sive knowledge of primitive closeness relations, and it fails to do so in a 
principled fashion. As you’ll recall, though, there is one option remain-
ing—claiming that the relevant similarity principle holds contingently, 
but via a general enough fact about agent x that God can extrapolate with 
certainty as to x’s behavior if x were given a genuine prophecy.
According to this approach, galaxies will be considerably less “orderly” 
than they were on the necessity view, because only in a select few galaxies 
will (e.g.) Peter perform the same action in C, C1, etc. Rather than cleanly 
dividing the galaxies into two classes, a contingent relevant similarity 
principle would leave a large variety in the sorts of world-type profiles 
one would find in the respective galaxies. To be sure, thanks to the truth 
of the principle, the galaxy with the true world-type will still be quite 
orderly, though. In that galaxy, Peter denies Christ in every circumstance 
R-related to C, but in other galaxies, things will be quite a bit more chaotic. 
(What it is for the principle to hold contingently is for the true world-type 
to conform to the principle, but for other world-types—world-types which 
could have been true—to fail to conform.)
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While there is no obvious incoherence in the idea of this sort of arrange-
ment, alas, there are once again serious problems (again, in the context of a 
foreknowledge-only view). The main problem is essentially the same one 
we saw above for the necessity fork—the unprincipled attempt to walk 
the fine line between completely denying God’s knowledge of primitive 
similarity relationships and embracing widespread divine knowledge of 
these things. But the problem is made even more stark with a contingent 
principle. A contingent principle would have the consequence that there 
will be distinct qualitatively identical worlds (qualitatively identical at all 
times) that differ from one another only in their primitive closeness rela- 
tionships with other isomorphic worlds (and hence, in what F-conditionals 
are true at them).
For example, there will be a world (call it w3) where Peter mishears 
Jesus and believes that Jesus prophesied his denial, and where Peter goes 
on to deny Jesus. There will be another world (call it w4) where things 
unfold (before, during, and after Peter’s mishearing) exactly as they do in 
w3. But w3 will be in a different galaxy from w4; w3 is in the glowing gal-
axy, so (e.g.) the F-conditional “Peter hallucinates Jesus prophesying (in 
the relevant circumstances) → Peter denies Christ” is true in w3, while it 
so happens that this same F-conditional is false in w4. But this entails that 
the closest hallucination world to w3 is one where Peter denies Christ, 
while the closest hallucination world to w4 is one where Peter doesn’t 
deny Christ (or perhaps there is a tie). But then suppose Peter does mis-
hear Jesus and believes Jesus has prophesied his denial (and in addition 
all else goes as w3 and w4 state); in this case, how will God even know 
which world has been actualized?42 Both w3 and w4 are qualitatively alike 
in all respects. The only possible answer, it seems, will be to appeal once 
again to God’s mysterious ability to grasp primitive closeness relation-
ships. God will have to sense how this world is related to other worlds—
and hence be aware of what counterfactuals are true at it—in order to zero 
in on which world it is. And, just as we saw before, there is no principled 
way to take this step and refuse to take the further step of embracing 
Molinism’s more expansive affirmation of God’s ability to know closeness 
relationships.
So, to sum up, all of the three forks open to the foreknowledge-only 
proponent in answering the question of the modal strength of the rel-
evant similarity principle (accidental, necessary, contingent in virtue of 
something general) lead to dead ends. Consequently, we have yet another 
42One might object that God did not, in fact, allow Peter to mishear Jesus in this way, 
and so the issue doesn’t arise. It is true that God didn’t allow Peter to mishear in this way, 
although there are presumably many cases where individuals actually performed free ac-
tions in particular circumstances. The problem arises in all such cases where the relevant 
similarity principle is supposed to apply; cases related to prophecy are not required to 
make the point. So, e.g., if Curley freely accepts a $5,000 bribe from Fat Tony on a particular 
street corner on a specific day, then he would have accepted the same bribe from Fat Tony’s 
identical twin (whom he is unaware is not Fat Tony) had it been offered at that same place 
on that same day. But in a different galaxy, the same pattern will not play out. 
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reason to reject the claim that foreknowledge-only cases can handle 
prophecies using a relevant similarity principle.
Can Molinism Do Any Better?
Molinism, by accepting an extreme (but principled) view of God’s ability 
to know primitive closeness relationships, is able to get around the con-
cerns that plagued foreknowledge-only views in the last section. Since the 
Molinist is happy to admit that God is aware both of the primitive close-
ness of sets of CWDs to his creative starting point and primitive closeness 
relationships between worlds, there is no issue of opportunistic shiftiness 
on the question of God’s abilities in this sphere. And the Molinist can 
also avoid the earlier problems associated with knowledge of disjunctions 
that plagued the foreknowledge-only proponent; as Pruss acknowledges, 
the Molinist God can simply employ knowledge of the relevant similarity 
principle along with his Middle Knowledge to arrive at absolute confi-
dence about the acceptability of issuing prophecies in at least some partic-
ular cases. This will involve no unacceptable circularity in explanation or 
unpalatable claims about God’s knowledge of disjunctive propositions.43
There are a couple of lessons that the Molinist should bear in mind, 
however, as she attempts to fine-tune this account. One issue is that, if the 
Molinist attempts to hold that the relevant similarity principle is contin-
gent, there may be difficulties in motivating the claim that it can ground 
the absolute certainty God needs in order to prophesy responsibly. Recall 
that, in a sense, the problem Pruss originally took Flint to task over was 
his failure to explain how a harmonious set of F-conditionals could be 
extrapolated to a situation of genuine prophecy. While it does not seem 
that Flint really attempts to distinguish the purely accidental harmony of 
a set of F-conditionals with harmony grounded in something general but 
nevertheless contingent, it may be that at the end of the day this distinc-
tion is very hard (or even impossible) to draw. What would this sort of 
general (but nonetheless contingent) feature look like, and how would we 
know that a genuine prophecy world would be a member of the “glowing 
galaxy,” as it were?44
Consequently, the Molinist might have better luck going with the 
claim that the relevant similarity principle holds necessarily. While this 
approach might come with its own set of mysteries, those mysteries 
would probably not be unpalatable, nor would it be unprincipled to live 
with them.45 (An example of such a mystery: how would we represent in 
43It will involve no unpalatable circularity in explanation assuming the basic outlines 
of Molinism are correct. As discussed previously, we are not entertaining what we have 
called “external” critiques of Molinism here—i.e., challenges to the metaphysical or episte-
mological plausibility of Molinism as a general position.
44Pruss raises a similar issue (“Prophecy Without Middle Knowledge,” 447).
45Pruss does acknowledge issues for the view that the principle holds necessarily, but 
points out that many of these are general problems that face us in our understanding of 
necessary truths (“Prophecy Without Middle Knowledge,” 449).
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possible worlds terms a relevant similarity principle that held in all pos-
sible situations except genuine prophecy and one that held in all possible 
situations simpliciter?)
If the Molinist holds that the relevant similarity principle is true neces-
sarily, though, there may be a further price if Molinism is to avoid its own 
charges of unprincipled conduct. For we might wonder: why should a rel-
evant similarity principle apply only to a particular agent? (Why, in other 
words, should the principle only attend to circumstances that stand in a 
particular relation to one another, but where the circumstances always 
involve the same agent?) Maybe different agents who are qualitatively 
similar enough to one another would always freely do the same thing if 
placed in the same circumstances. So, given that Curley accepts a $5,000 
bribe in circumstances C (and so, consequently, Curley would also have 
freely accepted a $5,000 bribe in circumstances R-related to C), why sup-
pose—to use an extreme example—that someone qualitatively identical to 
Curley would not also have freely accepted such a bribe in C? Taking the 
principle this far might be enough to make the Molinist a little squeamish, 
but it also might be required if the Molinist is not to wind up in her own 
subtle (but nonetheless potentially damning) state of hypocritical half-
heartedness.
In any case, we have gone far enough for present purposes. It is clear 
that foreknowledge-only accounts fail on their own terms to account for 
prophecy of free actions for two separate reasons—one involving an im-
plausible view of God’s knowledge of disjunctions and the other involv-
ing an unprincipled attempt to strike a balance between two competing 
extreme views of God’s knowledge (as it relates to F-conditionals). And 
it is also clear that Molinism does quite a bit better on its own terms. 
While it may not have yet cleared up every little mystery and it may not 
be without its theoretical costs, so long as its basic outlines are coherent, it 
does not run afoul of circularity problems (like the ones associated with 
disjunctive knowledge for the foreknowledge-only proponent) nor does it 
have difficulty taking a principled and consistent stand on God’s knowl-
edge of primitive closeness relations.
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